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Bolivia's traditional exports have been mainly of high value raw materials, like tin and silver, and of natural gas. Recently, non-traditional exports (that in Bolivia is everything that is not minerals or natural gas) have taken a momentum. These exports are directed, to a significant extent, to our neighbors. As important, the neighbor countries are the most important source of Bolivia's imports. Contrary to what happens in most Latin American countries, for Bolivia the neighbors are among her more important trade partners. A significant share of the trade with our neighbors is deemed to be border trade, although numbers are hard to come by. Difficult internal transportation and communications underscore the importance of border trade for Bolivia.
A recurrent question in the paper is the extent to which some features of border trade can be spread to increasingly larger zones. There is also the related question whether the economic integrated zones should be just extensions of border trade or should they have their distinct characteristics, many of them resulting from bilateral negotiations.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section I we describe the Bolivian trade in the regional context, including some numbers that illustrate the direction of the trade flows. In the same section we survey Bolivia's regional integration agreements, limiting ourselves in the discussion to the arrangements with our close neighbors. In section II we look at some specificities of border relations in the general framework of international trade. Also, we report there Bolivia's main border points and the characteristics of their trade. In section III we explore the implications of enlarging the border trade and constituting economic integrated zones. In section IV we conclude.
I. Main Features of Bolivia's Regional Economic Relations
I.1
The Regional Context Before focusing on the specific aspects of regional trade, it is worth recalling the main characteristics of Bolivia's trade regime. Since the mid 1980s Bolivia has undertaken a very substantial unilateral trade liberalization. There are not quantitative restrictions, and tariffs have a uniform level of 10%, except a small list of capital goods that bear a tariff of 5%. There is a drawback for non-traditional exports, that due to administrative deficiencies, can become a small subsidy for some goods. Given these features, effective rates of protection are essentially uniform.
Although Bolivia's liberalization policy has been undertaken unilaterally, it responds however to a trend in the region. All countries have been liberalizing their trade substantially. 2 Also, custom unions like the Andean Pact, to which Bolivia belongs, have adopted a policy of low common external tariffs in line with what the individual members were doing. Each country in the neighborhood observes that its trading partners are pursuing policies that are grossly similar to what is followed at home. Source: Central Bank of Bolivia, Bulletin of the External Sector, No. 11, 1994 The trend is clear, but the countries are still far from a situation of free trade. Their tariff rates continue to be above the ones of most industrial countries. Either as an intermediate step to free trade, or as an end in itself, Bolivia and the other countries in the region have entered since 1992 in a rush of bilateral agreements, that further reduce tariffs and quantitative 2 For a recent and comprehensive survey, see Agosín and French-Davis (1993). restrictions. The similarity in economic policies has eased the regional arrangements and has favored them over broader agreements, that may involve countries with different regulations. 3 A similar argument is given by Jones (1993) . See also de Melo et al., (1993) that observe that the current regionalism is taking place in an environment of outward-oriented policies.
The huge fall in the price, and therefore in the value, of the natural gas sales to Argentina largely explains the decline in the share between 1990 and 1993.
It is readily seen that the neighbor countries are, by far, the most important suppliers of imports to Bolivia. Imports from these countries were as high as 44% in 1990; they still constituted 35% of imports in 1993.
The balance-of-trade of 1993 represents what has happened in recent years (table 2) .
Bolivia has very substantial deficits with Brazil, Chile and even with Argentina, despite the sales of natural gas and the overvaluation of the Argentinean peso. 4 Only with Peru there is a small surplus. (Data of imports from Paraguay are unavailable.)
The pattern of trade with the region is very similar to the pattern with world as a whole.
Bolivia exports to her neighbors mainly food products, like soybeans and sugar, and raw materials like natural gas, timber, hides, and metals. In contrast, she imports from them manufactured goods, machinery and transportation equipment, chemical products and, to a lesser extent, food (table 3) . A significant proportion of imports from our neighbors is constituted by semielaborated industrial products. This is due to low transportation costs.
The data in large and larger than the non-registered trade balance. This was the result of higher nonregistered than registered imports. As the sol overvaluation was somewhat corrected, contraband imports from Peru started to flow again to Bolivia. From the second quarter of 1993 onward the trade balances reduce themselves and the differences between registered and non-registered trade narrow substantially.
The ultimate goal of LAIA is the establishment of a free trade zone in Latin America.
The integration mechanisms calls for bilateral negotiations, that often have been very slow and have lasted more than what was initially foreseen. The Andean Pact is of a larger scope than LAIA, as it intends to convert itself very rapidly into a customs union. The Andean Pact has provided the main reference points for the ambitious trade agreement with Peru. Bolivia has signed several regional agreements on trade and investment. The expression "Doña Flor and her two husbands" has been used by President Sánchez de Lozada to circumvent the difficult choice.
foreign investment. This is because supranational arrangements diminish the margins for discretionary policies, and reduce the vulnerability of decision-making to interest groups. 6
The scope of the trade agreement with Peru is very ample. In the framework of the Andean Pact, Bolivia and Peru agreed in 1992 to liberalize almost completely their bilateral trade. The liberalization implies: (a) zero tariffs; (b) the dismantlement of quantitative restrictions applying to products originated in the territory of each country. The two countries acknowledge also the need to eliminate export subsidies and correct domestic policies that distort trade.
Notwithstanding the general character of the liberalization program with Peru, agricultural products have a special treatment. For a list of food products, each country can maintain, in a non-discriminatory fashion, the regulations that were in force at the time of signing the agreement. Also, the two countries assented a reduction of 50% of the surtaxes applying to a list of food products by December 31, 1993. Additionally, they agreed not to extend surtaxes to other products beyond the list in force in 1992. 7
The agreement with Peru contains safeguards to cover the cases of severe prejudice caused by imports to a given branch. The country hurt by an inordinate flow of imports from the other partner can use transitorily corrective measures, if no accord is reached before. Also, there is an annex with very detailed rules of origin.
Independently of the trade agreement but with implications on it, Peru has offered
Bolivia to use freely the port of Ilo, located in her southern region. Also, Bolivia would enjoy the advantages of a free zone there. The port facilities are now almost inexistent and substantial investments would have to be undertaken by Bolivia to use effectively this sea outlet. The road connecting La Paz to Ilo is also in a very poor condition. Still, in the future Ilo could become a competitor of Arica, in northern Chile, as the main port to serve western
Bolivia.
Bolivia has also agreements of economic complementarity with Argentina and Brazil, within the framework of the Treaty of Montevideo of 1980 that created LAIA. These agreements provide for the elimination of quantitative restrictions on bilateral exchange, and the enlargement as well as the deepening of tariff preferences for lists of products. They also 6 De Melo et al., (1993) highlight these points when discussing the political dimensions of regional integration arrangements.
aim at the formation of joint industrial ventures. The tariff preferences are stipulated in terms of percent reductions of the tariffs applying to imports from third countries.
The accord with Argentina is more encompassing than the one with Brazil. It gives relevance to intra-industry trade, promoting common projects among enterprises of the two signatories, and the formation of bi-national companies. Tariff reductions can go to 100%, for the importation of final and intermediate goods for approved projects of bilateral industrial integration. Also, goods imported in the context of this program can be considered of domestic origin in the computations required to comply with rules of origin.
Interestingly, it is with Chile, the only Bolivian neighbor that does not belong to either the Andean Pact or MERCOSUR, that trade negotiations have been the most active. Also, trade between the two countries has been increasing very rapidly, although it has produced a very large deficit in the Bolivian trade balance with Chile.
Bolivia and Chile signed in 1991 an Agreement on Economic Complementarity (AEC), that falls short of establishing a free trade zone. Nevertheless the agreement has an ample scope to liberalize mutual trade. The stated objectives of AEC are: (1) the pursuit of a growing and progressive economic integration of the two countries;
(2) the facilitation of mutual investments in the two countries;
(3) the harmonic development of trade between the two countries; (4) the provision of a framework for economic cooperation of all types; (5) the promotion of cooperation between the private sectors of both countries. It is noteworthy in the AEC the concession by Chile without reciprocity of some tariff preferences. This concession was probably prompted by the initial condition of a very large deficit.
Tariff preferences are the main instrument of the AEC. There is a list of items for which zero tariffs apply in both countries for imports from each other. AEC also ratifies previous tariff concessions, given within LAIA, with rates that are still positive. The list of items with tariff preferences can be enlarged by mutual agreement. Also, the tariff concessions within LAIA can be further reduced.
AEC in many ways is more than a trade agreement. It also includes the treatment of mutual investments and outlines the procedures for cooperation in the area of energy. In Second, Bolivia is interested in enlarged markets with preferential arrangements like in a FTA, because many of her non traditional exports, mainly agricultural commodities, face strong competition in international markets. Also they suffer the effects of protectionist policies in, industrial and developing, countries outside the region.
Third, the prospect of more trade with her neighbors provides a strong motivation to improve Bolivia's own transportation network. Moreover, linkages with foreign networks enhance the value of the domestic transportation network. The likelihood of the interconnections increases with FTAs. 9 In addition, an FTA can partially compensate high transportation costs.
Fourth, the trade agreements in the region usually have special temporary clauses that apply to Bolivia and lessen for her the costs of joining. With a FTA Bolivia wins access to the potential benefits up front, while the costs are distributed over a long period.
Last, membership in a FTA is seen as a means to attract direct foreign investment and financing from international lenders. In particular, loans to finance the transportation projects are more forthcoming when they link two (or more) countries involved in a FTA. 10
The neighbor countries may find interest in Bolivia's participation in their FTA on two accounts. First, while Bolivia's market for their exports is small, it is by no means negligible.
Exports, including exports of services, to Bolivia can be especially important for given regions within a country. This is clearly the case of the First Region in northern Chile. In passing, it is this feature that gives leverage to Bolivia's position in the trade negotiations. Second, trade in transit through Bolivia may be of interest. We tackle this point later.
II. International Trade and Border Trade

II.1 Main Characteristics of Border Trade
The single most important characteristic of border trade is that transportation costs are very low in the concerned regions. Because of this, trade can be very active, although the overall regional development will depend of several other factors, including the density of population.
As transportation costs fall between border towns and the main inland cities there is a natural enlargement of the zone of influence of the border. Large cities, not too far away from the borders, should gain of this for a while.
In From another angle, the border economic relationships are of trade of international merchandises and non-factor services, and of factor movements, especially labor. Merchandise trade is of two kinds, goods produced in Bolivia and in the neighbor countries, and goods in transit from third countries. In the latter case, trade with the contiguous countries is in services attached to the transportation and handling of merchandises in transit. For a landlocked country the amounts spent in the importation of these services can be very substantial.
Transportation costs work as a tariff giving protection to a host of activities. In the presence of high transportation costs, the production of some goods is possible even if this is done in a less efficient way than in other countries. The tariff-like effect of high transportation costs may cause a diversified pattern of production, with some industrialization, some of which exhibit increasing returns.
Figure 1: Bolivia´s border towns and main cities
As transportation costs fall the concentration of production occurs naturally, on one side or the other of the national boundary, and may be impeded only by national policy measures, which anyway are difficult to carry out at that level. In addition, the government may deepen specialization by liberalizing the specific constraints spanned by economic policy that block the natural evolution of border trade. In a way, liberalization will act first on border trade enlarging it.
The examination of trade creation and trade diversion, that is fundamental in the assessment of the formation of free trade zones, should apply also to the enlarged border areas.
As transportation costs fall in a given region some trade will be diverted from other countries and regions. More important, intra-regional trade increases but so does specialization in production.
Border economic relationships, as stated above, don't limit themselves to merchandises.
In fact, cross-border factor movements are becoming increasingly significant. Labor moves freely, often illegally, in the border towns. Besides, the profit opportunities in border towns of purchasing goods there and selling them in major cities induce movements of people from locations far away from the border. This transient population can be very important.
Consequent to the new legal regime of temporary importation for goods that will be reexported, there has been a rush to create free zones for commercial and production purposes (table 6) . To date, only the commercial free zones have been active.
The government of Bolivia has been trying to attract investment in maquiladoras in towns close to the borders, although not necessarily so. Because of the absence of a border development policy, almost all free zones are located close to the largest cities of the country.
As is well known, maquiladoras are most advantageous when producing finished products, with a well known technological process, and for large markets that can be easily attained. This is not so in the Bolivian border towns. 11 Bolivia can only offer cheap, unskilled labor. Even so, the quantity of workers on border towns has not yet reached a critical mass to 11 In general, maquiladoras produce a relatively elaborated product, with intensive use of labor. They are attracted to a given location if they find following advantages: make the towns attractive for maquiladoras. While border towns cannot yet host maquiladoras, the city of La Paz, with its supply of services and abundant labor, has been doing so with some success, especially in the clothing and jewelry industries.
Investment originated in our neighbors in Bolivia or from Bolivia into them is still scant, but is growing rapidly. The growth is so important that Bolivia has signed mutual guarantees for the investments with some countries. The effects of macroeconomic instability are felt not only in border trade, but also in the movements of factors. It must be said, in passing, that the border town markets for foreign exchange are very active.
II.2 Main Border Posts
We have intended to identify Bolivia's towns that have an important border trade or are main entrepôts (table 7) . Also, we have constructed a table with the populations in the main towns on the other side of the border of contiguous countries (table 8) In difference with Chile, practically all goods are Brazilian.
There is some trade with Paraguay, consisting almost entirely of overseas products, but this goes through very sparsely populated areas. Most of this exchange is not registered.
It is worth nothing that unitary transportation costs and distance from the border to the city of La Paz are not fully correlated (table 7) . For instance, the unit transport costs from The border economy is still weakly integrated to the rest of the economy. However, their integration can be foreseen principally through the services that border towns could offer to facilitate trade. These services could be especially relevant for bulky products, like semielaborated industrial inputs, that constitute a high share of Bolivian imports, as stated above. Also special border services are needed for most Bolivian non-traditional exports, that are also bulky.
The border zones do not and are not expected to generate in the next years much income to the economy from activities in the production of goods. Only, when a fully integrated economic region is constituted this may occur.
As it stands now border trade is not significant enough. The development of border towns is marred by two problems, that cannot be overcome by incentives for investment and production. First, none of the neighbor countries has a large economic center near the border town (table 8) . Second, economic instability, particularly in the 1980s, severely hurt the development prospects of the towns.
III. Potential Benefits and Costs in the Expansion of Border Trade
Border trade can contribute to growth in two major ways. First, by using the advantages of from their proximity to La Paz. In turn, La Paz can gain from access to the ports, the transportation facilities and other services, and the markets that these regions provide.
Regional leaders in Chile, Bolivia, and Peru, mainly in the first cited country, have advanced the idea of a large integrated zone. The zone would include the First and Second
Regions of Chile, the southern departments of Peru, western Bolivia, especially the area surrounding La Paz, and northwest Argentina. The ideas that have been thrown for the integrated zone include pell-mell the following. The undertaking of major improvements in the existing port and storage facilities in Chile, the construction of the port of Ilo in Peru, and the multinational coordination of efforts to modernize the railroad network as well as to pursue the program of highway constructions in the integrated region. There is not yet a formed blueprint. 12 Hubbing is frequent in the market for air traffic. Economic theory and empirical evidence shows that hubbing reduces airline total costs. Also confers market power to the airline in the hub. 13 For example, if instead of making round trips from Arica to La Paz warehouses in Tambo Quemado (on the Chilean border) are built, high tonnage haulers can go from Arica to Tambo Quemado and then distribute their cargo in smaller trucks to the cities in western Bolivia. Also, high tonnage haulers can go from Bolivia to Tambo Quemado and distribute their cargo it in the northern Chilean cities with smaller trucks. The transportation mode will depend very much on merchandise. In both cases there will be gains in efficiency.
Bolivia aims at converting herself in a major supplier of natural gas, competing in this endeavor with northern Argentina, that also has large deposits. She also aspires to become a distribution center of natural gas to the region. Since transportation for that energy is through ducts, geography does matter. The hub and spokes model will fully apply to a regional market for natural gas, with a hub in the eastern department of Santa Cruz. 14 Also, it is through Bolivia that a main railroad link between the Atlantic and the Pacific can be completed. The conclusion of the railroad linkage between the eastern and western networks in Bolivia, for which only a stretch is missing, could provide in particular a ground access for Brazilian exports to the Pacific Basin. Brazil could then export through Bolivia to Chile, Peru, and beyond to countries in the Asian Pacific rim. Obviously, trade in the other direction also would be possible. Also, we could think of Peru trading with Argentine through Bolivia. Since mining is a very important activity in the region, we can expect the formation of joint ventures and multinational enterprises, with firms of the four concerned countries. This natural outcome of market forces can be given an additional push with the coordination of reforms in the national legislations on mining, and of public investments in infrastructure that support the mining activity.
As a prerequisite for the economic integrated zone, the current agreements of economic complementarily have to evolve toward the more advanced form of free trade agreements.
Within an economic integrated zone, many foreign industries will find convenient to produce in Bolivia. These firms could secure the market of Bolivia and her neighbors. If they reach sufficient dimension they can go also outside the region.
The discussion above seems conducing to the conclusion that expanding border trade and, more generally, joining FTAs should be welfare improving, both domestically and globally. This conclusion needs upon closer examination some qualifications, as international trade along with benefits also generates risks. Bolivia's initial condition of significant economic backwardness vis-à-vis three of her neighbors creates the danger that her low degree of industrialization would decrease even more. Production risks being confined to primary products, using location-specific factors (land and mineral resources), with little technological spillovers, and without the benefit of increasing returns to scale. As an outcome of the process she would be driven to a long lasting situation of very low wages and incomes. 15 The coreperiphery model could be replicated in a regional scale, and Bolivia could be pushed toward the outer ring. The gap in wages and incomes relative to those of the more advanced neighbors would narrow only when transportation costs fall further, when the advantages of location become less important, and the mobility of industry increases. 16 Still, backtracking in the current liberalization program cannot be a realistic approach to the danger mentioned in the paragraph above. In addition, the enforcement of regulations restraining trade has been always very difficult and costly, although not completely ineffective, on a vast territory with low population density. 17 The proper response to the challenge is gaining, perhaps just maintaining, high productivity in proven sectors of natural resources and, ironically in view of what has been said above, in exploiting advantages in location. Some Bolivian resource-based industries (e.g., edible oils, manufactures of non-ferrous metals and wood) have shown that can compete well internationally. The possibility of exploiting the advantages of location have been dealt amply above.
IV. Conclusions
We have surveyed in the text the current conditions of border trade. We can conclude that the importance of this trade cannot be underestimated, even if on surface seems remote to the main trade policy concerns. Locally, border trade has the potential to increase production and consumption in regions that often are far from the main cities. It means economic activity in areas that otherwise would have very little and is a source of stable incomes.
More important, even if the concentration of population in the border areas is low, they may have good prospects as transit and distribution centers for goods for the inland country.
They have the potential to become important suppliers of services. Also, there is high labor mobility in the border points, with workers moving easily from one side of the border to the other.
Border trade has been in many ways a predecessor of the current attempts at regional integration. Goods and factors have circulated freely for years in limited areas across national boundaries. As the costs of transacting over space decrease and the policy-generated walls to international trade disappear many (but not all) characteristics of border trade will naturally spread to the rest of the economy. Yet, geography will continue to have policy relevance.
Even more, economic policy should strive to draw maximum benefit of location. One avenue for this is the formation of economic integrated regions, with region taken in a somewhat narrow meaning.
The economic integrated regions may be, in difference with border trade, intensive in economic policy and international negotiations. This places the problem in the context of preferential trading arrangements and joint spacial planning. The national policy problem is then whether to have a single trade policy, pursuing unilaterally further liberalization, or to have a set of bilateral agreements, on a quid pro quo basis, one with each partner country or, eventually, groups of countries. The advantages of a unilateral and non-discriminatory process should not be discarded outright, given Bolivia's economic size. The problems of timing and opportunity in the liberalization call however for bilateral and regional arrangements, including those concerning integrated zones.
The constitution of economic integrated regions doesn't produce only uncontested benefits. Unfortunately, the dissimilarity in the level of Bolivia's development vis-à-vis her 25 neighbors conditions the distribution of economic activities. Unless great domestic efforts are consented, our country faces the risk of remaining stuck with only primary sectors. The question of Bolivia's national advantages from preferential trade agreements with countries of significant larger economic size in the close vicinity has yet to have an unambiguous answer.
Last, long term Bolivia's integration to other economies cannot be limited to agreements with only the five contiguous countries. At some point the decline in transportation costs will reduce the advantages of integrated economic zones, geographically close. Bolivia, following another trend in Latin America, may find in her interest to apply to integration schemes with large, developed countries.
